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Abstract 
 
Liberalisation of generation and supply activities in the electricity sectors is 
often followed by regulatory reform of distribution networks. In order to 
improve the efficiency of distribution utilities, some regulators have adopted 
incentive regulation schemes that rely on performance benchmarking. 
Although regulation benchmarking can influence the “regulation game”, the 
subject has received limited attention. This paper discusses how strategic 
behaviour can result in inefficient behaviour by firms. We also present a 
survey of issues encountered by electricity regulators. We then use the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method with US utility data to examine 
implications of selected cases of strategic behaviour. The results show that 
gaming can have significant effects on the measured performance and 
profitability of firms. 
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STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR UNDER REGULATION BENCHMARKING 
 
Tooraj Jamasb     Paul Nillesen*     Michael Pollitt 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
From the early 1990s, many countries throughout the world have liberalised their electricity 
industries, transforming their structure and changing the rules governing their operation. An 
important aspect of this development has been the establishment of regulatory agencies or, 
where a regulator already existed, a shift from overseeing the operation of centralised 
sectors with vertically integrated utilities operating under rate-of-return (ROR) regulation, 
to overseeing the operation of decentralised sectors with unbundled activities. In the 
liberalised sectors, the potentially competitive generation and supply activities operate in a 
market-oriented environment. Transmission and distribution networks, generally viewed as 
natural monopolies, have also undergone regulatory reform. 
Strategic behaviour of regulated firms, including electric utilities, is extensively 
discussed within the context of ROR regulation and the existence of asymmetric 
information between firm and regulator (see e.g. Armstrong and Cowan et al., 1994; and 
Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). More recently, the strategic behaviour of generating companies 
in the form of exercising market power in wholesale electricity markets of liberalised 
sectors, has attracted considerable interest. Market power in wholesale electricity markets 
can arise from ownership concentrations, lack of access to, and constraints in, transmission 
networks, tight supply-demand conditions, and flawed trading and regulatory arrangements. 
This interest has arisen from the failure of reform design to ensure effective competition in 
some countries, the recent electricity crisis in California, and to some extent the collapse of 
energy trader Enron (see e.g. Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak, 2002; and Joskow and 
Kahn, 2002). 
At the same time, in the post reform era some jurisdictions have moved away from 
ROR regulation of transmission and distribution utilities and adopted incentive-based 
models. Some regulators, in particular in Europe and Australia, have adopted benchmarking 
as a tool in the incentive regulation of network utilities (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). This 
development has effected the nature of the “regulation game” played between regulator and 
utilities. This emerging aspect of regulation gaming or strategic behaviour has received 
relatively little attention. 
In this paper we focus on strategic behaviour, or gaming, in the context of 
benchmarking in incentive-based regulation of distribution utilities. We refer to strategic 
behaviour or gaming as type of behaviour that aim to increase profits without achieving 
real efficiency gains, i.e. they defy the incentive purpose of benchmarking, the regulatory 
objectives of efficient operation, and protection of public interest. It should be noted that 
“gaming” behaviour is not necessarily illegal and should be viewed within the regulatory 
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context, as the optimisation process must remain within general accounting, fiscal, legal, 
and corporate governance statutes and policies. 
In this study we identify and examine the ways in which benchmarking can influence 
firms’ behaviour and we attempt to analyse the possible implications. Then utilising a data 
set comprising the distribution activities from a sample of US electric utilities from several 
states, we illustrate some strategic issues that a Public Utility Commission overseeing few 
electric utilities may encounter when using frontier-based benchmarking in incentive 
regulation. The purpose of the exercise is to examine the main issues involved and draw 
lessons from potential gaming that are general and applicable to other regulatory settings. 
The following section reviews gaming aspects of incentive regulation and regulatory 
benchmarking. Section 3 presents a survey of selected electricity regulators on strategic 
gaming issues. Section 4 describes the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique as the 
benchmarking tool. Section 5 describes the data set of US electricity distribution businesses 
used in the study and our preferred models of analysis. Section 6 describes the main 
findings of our quantitative analysis of various gaming strategies on the outcome of 
regulatory benchmarking. Section 7 is a discussion of lessons and conclusions. 
 
2. Gaming in Incentive Regulation Benchmarking 
 
2.1 Incentive regulation 
 
Asymmetric information between the regulator and the regulated firm is a key issue in the 
regulation of natural monopolies. Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1986) 
address regulation of monopoly firms in the presence of asymmetric information in the 
form of unknown costs and unobservable effort to reduce costs.1 A rather common criticism 
of the ROR regulation model is that it lacks incentives for efficiency improvements and 
encourages firms to engage in strategic behaviour. Averch and Johnson (1962) showed that 
ROR regulation encourages utilities to inflate their regulatory asset base through over-
investment and socially inefficient resource allocation. The argument finds some parallels 
in the US power sector in the 1970s and 1980s where stranded costs of over-investment in 
generation capacity contributed to electricity price increases and, consequently, the calls for 
restructuring of the sector in the high-price states (Joskow, 1997). 
Regulatory reform of network industries around the world has challenged the 
traditional ROR regulation, as regulators have adopted a variety of incentive-based models. 
These models aim to provide monopolies with the incentive to utilise their exclusive 
information on effort and costs to improve operating efficiency and investment decisions, 
and to ensure that consumers benefit from the efficiency gains.2 In the US, incentive-based 
regulation is generally termed Performance-Based Regulation or Rate-Making (PBR). This 
interest in incentive regulation is not due to new contributions from economic theory, 
rather, it reflects the need and desire for new practical approaches to regulation, even 
                                                          
1
 See also Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers (1994) for a review of these models. 
2
 See Joskow and Shmalensee (1986) for a discussion of the main approaches to incentive regulation of 
electric utilities. 
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though these may not always be fully in line with theory (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996, p. 
215). 
In this paper we focus on price/revenue cap regulation model based on the RPI-X 
formula.3 Price cap regulation de-couples profits from costs by setting maximum prices for 
the duration of a specified regulatory lag or rate period. The utility is then allowed to retain 
the profits in terms of the difference between the regulated price and its actual costs during 
the (typically 5-year) rate period. Price cap regulation was first implemented in post-
privatisation regulation of British Telecom (Littlechild, 1983). The model has since been 
adopted in the regulation of other sectors in Britain and in many other countries.4 
An important feature of incentive regulation is the use of benchmarking, which can 
be broadly defined as the comparison of a firm’s actual performance against some pre-
defined reference or benchmark performance. A perceived advantage of benchmarking has 
been that it reduces the information asymmetry problem that occurs in ROR regulation by 
reducing the regulator’s reliance on the firm’s own costs, but references the price to an 
external non-influencable benchmark. 
 
2.2 Regulatory Benchmarking – Methods, Techniques, and Setting of X-factors 
 
The most contentious issue in price cap regulation is the basis for determining efficiency 
improvements and the translation of these into tariff changes (X-factors). Regulators have 
adopted a variety of benchmarking methods to arrive at X-factors and it is in the 
implementation of these that the regulation game may be played. For the purposes of this 
study, we distinguish between two types of benchmarking methods used in setting the X-
factors: (i) frontier-based and (ii) non-frontier techniques.5 This division also reflects the 
divide in benchmarking approaches used by, on the one hand, the European and Australian 
electricity regulators, and the PUCs in the United States on the other hand. The European 
regulators have generally adopted frontier-based benchmarking methods as the basis on 
which to calculate the X-factors. The PUCs that have adopted PBR have tended to use 
measures such as Total Factor Productivity (TFP) to calculate the efficiency requirements. 
 
2.2.1 Frontier-Based Benchmarking Techniques 
 
In frontier-based benchmarking, the relative performance of a firm is measured in the form 
of efficiency scores on a scale of 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) against the best practice or 
efficient frontier of a sample of firms. Regulators then work out procedures for translating 
the efficiency scores into X-factors and setting initial prices for the rate period in question. 
The procedures that translate scores into tariffs and X-factors reflect the different objectives 
of regulators, such as speed of decisions, level of efficiency drive, or detail of output 
                                                          
3
 For the purpose of this study, unless specified, we do not differentiate between a price and a revenue cap 
regulation based on the RPI-X formula. 
4
 See Vickers and Yarrow (1993) for a description of the methodology and implementation in Britain. 
5
 The review of the methods in this section is based on Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) and Pollitt (1995). See also 
Coelli, Rap, and Battese (1998) and DTe (1999). 
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steering.6 The most widely used frontier-based benchmarking methods are Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Corrected Ordinary Least Square (COLS), and Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA). DEA is non-parametric and identifies the efficient frontier using a 
linear programming technique. In DEA, the relative efficiency of a firm is computed (rather 
than estimated) on a scale of 0 to 1 relative to best practice or to a sample of efficient firms. 
The technique is briefly described in the next section. 
COLS and SFA are statistical techniques that estimate the efficiency score of a firm 
relative to an efficient frontier. Both techniques require the specification of a production or 
cost function. Similar to DEA, the COLS technique assigns all deviation from the frontier 
to inefficiency. The efficiency scores calculated using COLS are therefore sensitive to the 
position of the frontier firms. SFA recognises the possibility of stochastic errors in the 
measurement of the inefficiencies. If there are no inefficiency measurement errors in the 
sample, the error assumption would result in some inefficiency being regarded as noise. 
Essentially, a part of the relative inefficiency is attributed to stochastic elements in the data 
rather than to the inefficient operation of the firm. Consequently, due to the measurement 
error factor, the SFA scores are likely to be higher than those measured by COLS. 
 
2.2.2 Non-Frontier Methods 
 
The most widely used benchmarking technique in non-frontier approaches is Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP). The method can, for example, use the Tornqvist index as a measure of 
historical productivity growth of the individual firm (internal benchmarking), the electricity 
sector (domestic or international), or the whole economy when setting the factor X in 
incentive regulation (see e.g. Coelli, Rap, and Battese, 1998). In either case, a simple 
Tornqvist TFP index can be expressed in terms of: 
 
TFP = (output index) / (input index)         (1) 
 
The Tornqvist input quantity requires information on quantity and cost share of inputs 
for the two periods for which productivity change is calculated. Equation (2) shows the 
Tornqvist input quantity index from the base period S to period t. The output index is 
calculated in a similar way. 
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The implementation of TFP-related X-factors for regulatory purposes is relatively 
easy, but the information requirement of the approach is non-trivial. Also, a potential 
weakness of the approach is that less efficient firms may find it easier than efficient firms to 
outperform the TFP and earn large profits.7 
A statistical average-based approach to benchmarking is the Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) technique. OLS estimates the average production or cost function of a sample of 
firms. The actual performance of firms can then be compared to the estimated performance 
by substituting actual input, output, and environmental data measured into the estimated 
function. 
In yardstick regulation, the mean of the costs of a peer group of firms can also serve 
as the benchmark for individual firms. In this approach, all the firms in the group are 
subject to the same price cap. A version of this approach has been used by the National 
Energy Commission (CNE) in Chile to calculate the value added for the distribution 
services. The value added for a group of comparable firms is derived from a designed 
efficient model or reference firm (see e.g. Rudnick and Donoso, 2000; Rudnick and 
Rainari, 1997). In Spain, the regulator has used model firms for specific geographical areas 
to allocate a portion of the total system revenues among distribution utilities. 
Also, the sliding scale method can be viewed as a form of average benchmarking 
where the target ROR in the dead-band is intended to represent a fair rate of return based on 
the return earned by comparable industries or firms in similar operating environments. The 
regulated utility is, therefore, competing with the average performance in the industry or 
economy. 
 
2.2.3 Other benchmarking methods 
 
The Norwegian Water and Energy Administration (NVE) has used the Value Chain Model 
(VCM) for one-to-one benchmarking of the state-owned central transmission utility 
Statkraft against the Swedish national grid company Svenska Kraftnät. The model allows 
for the adjustment of data to account for operational and environmental factors.8 There are 
also partial benchmarking approaches, such as the method applied in the study of electricity 
distribution utilities in the state of Victoria, Australia (see UMS, 1999). The method 
assumes separability of different cost categories and involves the comparison of firms of 
different scales. This drawback is potentially mitigated when the firms have similar 
technologies and scale. Finally, targeted incentive schemes can use average or frontier 
performance benchmarks to address specific aspects of operations of firms. These 
benchmarks may be based on the past or expected performance of the firm or industry. 
From a regulatory policy point of view, a major difference between the frontier and 
average benchmarking is that the former has a stronger focus on performance variations 
between firms. Frontier methods appear suitable at initial stages of regulatory reform when 
a primary objective is to reduce the performance gap among the utilities through firm-
                                                          
7
 The Dutch energy regulator DTe, intends to implement a generic X-factor method in the next regulatory 
period, starting in 2004. The generic X-factor will be based on the productivity growth of the frontier firms. 
See DTe (2002) for a detailed description of the proposed methodology for the next period. 
8
 See Magnus and Midttun (2000) for a brief description of the method. 
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specific efficiency requirements. Average benchmarking methods may be used to mimic 
competition among firms with relatively similar costs, or when there is a lack of sufficient 
data and comparators for the application of frontier methods. 
It should be noted that there is an important methodological difference between 
frontier and TFP based approaches to efficiency measurement. In the frontier-based 
approach, a relative efficiency score is measured for each firm relative to the efficient 
frontier. This results in a direct inter-dependence between a firm’s efficiency measure 
(score) and strategic behaviour involving frontier firms in the sample. In the index number 
approach to TFP at sector level, each firm’s benchmark is the same and can be marginally 
affected by own or other firms’ strategic behaviour. 
 
2.3 The nature of regulation benchmarking game 
 
In principle, the purpose of incentive regulation is to exploit the efficiency improvement 
potential of the regulated firm. Regulators should recognise that their benchmarking 
exercise inevitably shapes the efforts, and directs considerable resources, of the firms 
towards the make up and variables of these models. However, while benchmarking can 
measure “true” performance improvements, gaming can sometimes produce illusive or 
“virtual” efficiency improvements by. Therefore, benchmarking models need to strike a 
balance between reflecting the main performance drivers of the business in question and 
reducing incentives for engaging in unproductive method or model-induced strategic 
behaviour. 
This type of behaviour is rational from a firm’s perspective. Optimising the 
regulatory process and exploiting the information advantage will maximise profits for 
shareholders. In cases where customers are, directly or indirectly, shareholders (e.g. co-
operatives or mutuals in the strict sense, or municipal-owned), the firm’s excess profits 
might still benefit the local consumer. However, where customers have no relation with the 
capital of the firm, such regulatory strategies will lead to welfare losses. 
Regulated firms may attempt to influence the use of regulation benchmarking at the 
adoption stage. Although these efforts may not be considered as gaming, utilities may 
attempt to influence: (i) the use of benchmarking in incentive regulation, (ii) choice of 
method, model, and variables, (iii) definition of variables adopted during the consultation 
process, and (iv) translation of efficiency scores into X-factors. At a later stage, firms may 
use gaming strategies to benefit from the regulator’s adopted benchmarking model. 
Some regulation games are associated with the periodic aspect of ROR and incentive 
based regulatory reviews through timing of specific types of actions. Dynamic aspects of 
strategic behaviour of the firm associated with regulatory lag are known to regulators, and 
have been addressed by some authors (see e.g. Baumol and Klevoric, 1970; Sappington, 
1980). Di Tella and Dyck (2002), in a study of the Chilean electricity distribution utilities 
under price cap regulation, report evidence of cyclical cost reductions that coincide with the 
initial years of rate periods, and the reverse prior to the next rate review. 
Gaming behaviour is not only limited to private firms. Publicly-owned firms can also 
be motivated to pursue monetary or other performance measures. Several countries noted 
for the use of benchmarking, including The Netherlands, Norway, and Australia, have 
significant municipal or state ownership. Courty and Marschke (2002), in a study of job 
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training agencies, show that public organisations can engage in gaming by timing their 
performance reports in order to benefit from awards. They show that performance 
incentives can come at a cost by having a negative effect on efficiency. 
Broadly, it is possible to differentiate between two types of strategic behaviour. The 
first is behaviour that may not have a material effect on the efficient operation of the firm 
and is intended to present the performance of the firm in a more favourable light. For 
example, a firm may shift costs from operating to capital costs, or influence the choice of 
output variables in order to affect measured relative performance. The main undesirable 
outcome of such virtual efficiencies is that they result in welfare transfer from customers, 
or even other firms, to the gaming firm through lower efficiency targets than the true 
underlying efficiency would suggest. 
The second type of gaming is in the form of behaviour that distorts the efficient 
operation and investment decisions of the firm. For example, the firm might increase its 
cost base or delay efficiency improvements in periods leading to a new rate case. This type 
of gaming results in socially inefficient resource allocation and dead-weight loss. An 
important concern with both of these gaming categories in frontier-based approaches is 
that, due to the inter-dependency between the efficiency scores, a firm’s gaming can also 
affect the measured performance of other firms. 
In cost-based DEA models the regulator may use controllable operating expenditure 
(OPEX) as the input variable and treat capital expenditures (CAPEX) outside of the 
benchmarking exercise or alternatively use total expenditures (TOTEX). This has 
implications for the possible strategic behaviour by firms. A firm may appear more efficient 
by reducing costs, as well as by appearing larger in terms of higher output variables. For 
example, if the benchmarking model uses OPEX as input and network length or 
transformer capacity as output, and is given approval for expansion plans for increasing 
separately treated CAPEX, it can earn a return on its capital expenditures and, at the same 
time, increase the output variables and hence its relative efficiency. 
Alternatively, the regulator may use OPEX and CAPEX as two separate variables. 
This will allow the possible trade-offs between the two types of costs to be reflected in the 
model. It has been suggested that where OPEX is used as input variable the chosen outputs 
should be independent of CAPEX or adjusted to reflect their relative share of total costs 
(see Coelli, 2000). In general, a complicating factor in benchmarking is a question of which 
model specification best represents the activity of electric distribution utilities. Jamasb and 
Pollitt (2001) show that efficiency studies of distribution utilities have used a variety of 
variables and model specifications and the issue is not yet satisfactorily settled.9 
It should be noted that the choice of benchmarking model could also serve specific 
regulatory objectives. For example, the choice of constant or variable returns to scale 
models can affect the long-term structure of the sector. The Dutch regulator has used a 
constant returns to scale DEA model and assumes that firms can freely adjust their scale of 
operations through mergers and acquisitions. Other countries value the maintenance of the 
number of comparators and use variable returns to scale measures (e.g. the UK). The UK 
regulator has estimated the cost of information loss due to mergers among electricity 
                                                          
9
 In extremis certain variables may be used as inputs in one regulatory model, whereas in other regimes they 
are used as outputs. For a Dutch discussion see, Nillesen and Telling (2001). 
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distribution utilities at £32 million and applies a corresponding reduction in regulated 
revenue of the merged firms over a 5-year period (OFGEM, 2002). 
 
3. Strategic behaviour in action - A survey of electricity regulators 
 
As discussed in the previous section a perceived advantage of incentive regulation in 
general, and benchmarking in particular, is that they diminish the effect of information 
asymmetry in regulation by reducing the reliance on the firm’s own costs. A number of 
electricity regulators have now adopted regulation benchmarking. We have surveyed a 
select number of these electricity regulators on their experience with various aspects of 
strategic behaviour. 
The survey questions are outlined in Table 1 and the returns to the questionnaires are 
summarised in Table 2. The survey questions are structured against the backdrop of three 
possible types of gaming strategies. Questions in the first category are aimed at gaming that 
primarily involves cost issues. These questions explore strategic behaviour through shifting 
of costs and assets across sectors (e.g. electricity vs. gas or water) and within the electricity 
sector (e.g. generation, transmission, distribution, and supply), costing rules, definitions, 
and rate of return by firms. Questions in the second category address issues associated with 
the use of benchmarking models, output variables, and information disclosure. The two 
questions in the third category are concerned with mergers, an issue increasingly faced by 
electricity regulators. We follow a similar classification in the analysis of effects of selected 
possible strategies. 
It should be noted that determining whether certain behaviour by firms constitutes 
gaming is to some degree a subjective matter and therefore requires judgement. In other 
words, the perceived motives are often observed indirectly through their effect on the 
regulatory objectives or outcomes. Further, because of the complex interplay of firms and 
issues it is virtually impossible to isolate and predict the outcome of a particular strategy of 
an individual firm, making it difficult to separate cause and effect. All gaming opportunities 
must be conducted within the prevailing legal, accounting, fiscal and corporate governance 
regulations, so gaming should be seen as regulatory model optimisation, rather than 
fraudulent or deceptive behaviour. 
 
3.1 Operating and capital costs 
 
The periodic rate reviews in price cap regulation provide the regulated firm with an 
incentive to build-up or inflate their regulatory asset or cost base (RAB and RCB) prior to a 
rate review. In general, by building up the regulatory cost-base of the reference year 
through creating or accumulating costs, the firm can achieve a net gain by increasing its 
allowed revenues for the subsequent rate period. In particular, regulators in reforming 
countries have experienced that at the time of the unbundling of vertically integrated 
utilities, firms tend to shift costs and assets from potentially competitive activities to 
regulated businesses. The motivation is that by inflating their cost base, the firms can profit 
from certain allowed revenues over the rate period, a return that would not be guaranteed 
under competition. 
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The ability to influence costs is facilitated by the asymmetric information on the 
firm’s costs and intensity of effort to reduce those costs. In addition, when capital 
expenditures are excluded from the benchmarking model, there is an incentive to shift 
assets from competitive to regulated businesses in order to secure a regulated rate of return 
on these assets. 
As revealed in our survey, regulators have experienced a variety of cost and asset 
shifting strategies. Regulators A, D, and H have reported tendencies toward shifting OPEX 
and CAPEX to distribution business. It should be noted that Regulators D and H have used 
a total cost approach to benchmarking while Regulator A has only used OPEX. As shown 
in the table, the direction of shifting cost and assets in the activity chain to distribution has 
been both downwards from generation (Regulator H) and upwards from supply businesses 
(Regulators A and D). In addition, Regulators B and C state that requests by firms to 
include customer contributions in their regulatory asset base has been a source of 
disagreement between firms and regulator. 
Accounting rules and definitions of variables do not appear to have created major 
disagreements among the regulators and firms, although several iterations may be required 
to clarify definitions – which may influence the perception of certain actions. This may 
partly be due to the fact that accounting procedures are universal for the firms in a given 
sector and therefore the relative advantage to be gained from changes in the rules is likely 
to be limited.10 Indeed, in one surveyed jurisdiction where there is only a single distribution 
utility the accounting rules concerning the depreciation method has been an issue. 
 
3.2 Output and other model related issues 
 
The survey results also reveal that firms have attempted to influence the definition of 
outputs used in the regulators’ benchmarking exercise. They have raised such issues as 
which proxy measures of outputs should be included in the benchmarking models and how 
these variables should be measured. 
One frequently used output measure is the length of the network operated by the 
firms. Regulator D stated that some firms argued that circuit length rather than route length 
is the appropriate measure to represent network size, and final connections to customer 
should be included in this. Regulator F received a request that network length should be 
used as an input rather than an output. Another commonly used cost driver is the number of 
connections or customers they serve. Firms can also argue that the models or samples used 
do not accurately reflect the characteristics of their particular network. For example, a 
utility had argued that it is inherently different from the international comparators used in 
regulator B’s benchmarking sample. Some firms disputed the relative weights given to 
different output measures in the regulator’s models while others argued that DEA is more 
appropriate as benchmarking method. Resolving the issue of comparability can generally be 
addressed through the inclusion of additional discretionary or non-discretionary variables in 
                                                          
10
 Some discussions did take place with Regulator D over depreciation periods and the accounting treatment 
of customer contributions when connecting a new customer. 
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the model. In DEA-based models increasing the discriminatory power of models generally 
results in improving efficiency scores of firms.11 
 
3.3 Mergers and acquisitions 
 
The result of unbundling vertically integrated utilities, third party access to networks, and 
incentive-based regulatory reform, is that some distribution utilities may reassess their 
position in the sector and reposition themselves through mergers. The main motives are to 
reconfigure assets, achieve cost savings, and benefit from economies of scale. In many 
countries, there are a limited number of utilities and each merger reduces both the 
regulators’ information base and potential merger partners for other firms. Nevertheless, 
some countries have a large number of small utilities, and mergers may be desirable. 
It is difficult to determine whether, or to what extent, mergers are purely driven by 
gaming motives. However, it is conceivable that firms take note of the financial 
implications of benchmarking for the merged entity. An indicative case in our survey is that 
of a utility formed from the merger of three others who argued that it should be represented 
as one firm in the Regulator D’s benchmarking, just to reconsider and ultimately withdraw 
the request. 
The results of the survey confirm that regulators have experienced a variety of 
arguments or actions resulting in outcomes similar to those of gaming the regulation 
benchmarking. In Section 6 we use a simple framework to analyse the possible implications 
of selected types of strategic behaviour reported in the survey. 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Regulator D used two extra output variables in the benchmarking exercise in order to capture the fact that 
some of the network operators also owned and operated small transmission grids. The additional variables 
were large customers and transmission peak demand. 
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Table 1: Overview of survey questions 
Within the context of incentive regulation, what have been major disagreements/differences between the utilities and regulator with regards to: 
 
Category 1 – Operating and capital costs 
 
1. Allocation of costs or assets from competitive activities (generation, supply) to regulated activities (transmission, distribution)? 
 
2. Shifting assets between different regulatory regimes by multi-utilities? 
 
3. Level or definition of what constitutes controllable or un-controllable operating expenditures?  
 
4. Level or definition of what constitutes capital investments? 
 
5. Specific aspects of regulatory accounts and rules (e.g. for depreciation and goodwill)? 
 
6. Level of gearing or definition of financial costs as uncontrollable costs? 
 
7. Transfer pricing or outsourcing that inflate operating costs/transfer profits to other firms (e.g. supply business) in the same group? 
 
8. Rate of return and related issues e.g. level, calculation base, and dead-band? 
 
Category 2 – Output related and general issues 
 
9. (Low) levels of inputs or (high) levels of outputs when using relative comparative efficiency analysis? 
 
10. Specific model specifications (method and variables) in relative/comparative efficiency analysis and incentive regulation? 
 
11. Estimates/projections of important variables (e.g. demand, number of customers, investment requirements)? 
 
12. Adverse impacts on service quality (e.g. security, reliability), DSM measures, or T&D losses? 
 
13. Information disclosure - in general or particular types of information? 
 
Category 3 - Mergers and acquisitions 
 
14. Mergers and acquisitions that can affect/influence comparative efficiency analysis? 
 
15. Treatment of goodwill or other measures that inflate prices at mergers? 
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Table 2: Survey returns 
Ques-
tion 
 Regulator A Regulator B Regulator C Regulator D 
 
1 
Cost & Asset 
Reallocation 
Yes: In OPEX reallocation when separating 
S from D in 2000. 
No: In CAPEX reallocation. 
No No Yes: Cost allocation between S and D in 
power & gas. Data checking, hearings and 
workshops aimed to clarify definitions. 
 
2 
Shifting Assets 
Between 
Regulators 
Issue has not been explicitly up but has 
potential for OPEX (less so for CAPEX). 
No Yes: Considerable amounts. Regulator states 
that customers have paid for much of the 
firms’ capital base. 
Yes: Between gas and electricity assets. 
Although data checking, hearings and 
workshops aim to clarify definitions. 
3 Operating 
Costs 
Definitions gradually less of an issue. Levels 
expected to remain issue. 
No No No 
4 Capital 
Costs 
Less contentious than CAPEX. Level 
remains an issue. 
No No No 
 
5 
Accounting 
Rules 
Yes Regulator asked to use straight-line method 
for depreciation. Also requested inclusion of 
customer capital contributions in asset base. 
No Yes: One company submitted replacement 
costs rather then historical costs. 
6 Gearing & 
Financial Costs 
Yes. Regulator assumes 50-50 debt-equity as 
basis for calculation of WACC. 
No No No 
 
7 
Transfer Pricing 
& Outsourcing 
Was an issue previously but less in future. No No Yes: Audits are performed. Outsourcing is 
encouraged when improves efficiency. 
 
8 
Rate 
of Return 
 The approved WACC was 1.2% lower than 
the rate requested by utility. 
The ROR is 7%. It is corrected if a firm has 
equity > 40% and will be lowered by 0.1% 
for each percentage the equity is higher. 
No 
 
9 
Input & Output 
Levels 
Weights of components of composite 
variable. Some firms argue for and some 
against inclusion of quality of service. 
 No Yes: On network length e.g. route vs. circuit 
km or inclusion of final connection to 
customer. 
 
10 
 
Model 
Specification 
Some opposition against COLS and support 
for DEA 
Utility did not accept the benchmarking 
exercise and argued that firms in the sample 
were inherently different to them. 
To address uncertainty in data accuracy the 
regulator uses aggregate data in 
benchmarking e.g. in the construction of a 
city-country correction factor in 
benchmarking. 
No 
 
11 
Estimate/forecasts 
of important 
variables 
Yes: investments Utility estimate of number of new customers 
was 40% higher than the regulator’s. The 
regulator then included a revenue adjustment 
formula for new connections. 
With regard to the city vs. country correction 
factor there has been discussion whether to 
use the no. of customers or households 
instead of no. of meters used by the 
regulator. 
No 
 
12 
Adverse Effect on 
Quality, DSM, T/D 
Losses 
Gradually less important as firms’ asset 
management tools are better developed. 
No No Yes: Will be explicitly included in next price 
review. 
13 Information 
Disclosure 
Less of a issue now than previously  No. Yes: Information revelation impact of 
regulation 
 
14 
Strategic 
M&A 
Not so far but anticipated to affect future 
price controls 
No No Yes: One firm initially requested to be 
benchmarked as 3 separate units and later 
wished to be considered as one firm again. 
15 Price Inflation 
in M&A 
Not so far but possible No No: Annual accounts differ form regulatory 
accounts. 
No 
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Table 2: Survey returns (contd.) 
Ques-
tion 
 Regulator E Regulator F Regulator G Regulator H 
 
1 
Cost & Asset 
Reallocation 
Yes: ca 10% difference. Yes (Gas) – High marketing costs due 
to market barriers, climate, and 
competitors’ artificially low costs. 
Yes - 10-15% of OPEX subject to 
potential differences in cost allocation 
process. 
Utilities tended to shift costs and in 
particular assets to regulated activities 
(from G to D). 
 
2 
Shifting Assets 
Between 
Regulators 
Yes: continuos changes to study basis 
and methods. 
No No. Not so far. But possible in the future. 
 
3 
Operating 
Costs 
Yes: ca 15% No Yes: Approved OPEX was 25% lower 
than amount requested by utilities. 
No. Controls are at aggregate level. 
4 Capital 
Costs 
Yes - Reference firm not representative 
of concession area. 
Yes: Difference in estimates made by 
the utility and technical experts 
Yes – Approved CAPEX was 95% of 
the amount requested by firms. 
No. Controls are at aggregate level. 
 
5 
Accounting 
Rules 
No Yes (Gas): Objections to accounting 
codes for electricity distribution utilities 
and legal powers of the regulator. 
Yes - As in Q1. No. Utility reports are based on 
generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
6 Gearing & 
Financial Costs 
Yes: ca 10% No No. Financial costs are not part of controls 
as the focus is on operational results. 
 
7 
Transfer Pricing 
& Outsourcing 
No No Yes - As in Q1. Not so far. Possible in the future. 
 
8 
Rate 
of Return 
No Yes – 1 pp difference between 
requested and allowed market risk 
premium. Firms required higher 
regulatory uncertainty. 
Yes - Rural firms requested 1% 
increment to WACC to reflect higher 
risk, asset write-off, and natural 
disasters. 
Utilities claim efficiency improvements 
do not result in higher rate of return. 
9 Input & Output 
Levels 
Yes: No participation in the study. No No. No. But reported data can be controlled. 
 
10 
 
 
Model 
Specification 
Yes: No participation in the study. Yes – Use of network length as input or 
output variable 
Yes - Whether building block approach 
constitutes rate of return rather than 
price cap as required by law. 
Firms: DEA model unfavourable to 
small firms, climate, and sea cables. 
Regulator: large firms have little 
influence on scores and non-delivered 
energy variable reflects climate. 
 
11 
Estimate/forecasts 
of important 
variables 
No Yes – Difference in projected 
efficiency gains. Firms requested more 
CAPEX to reduce future OPEX. 
No. Accuracy of the variable non-delivered 
energy (introduced in 2001) is 
questioned. 
 
12 
Adverse Effect on 
Quality, DSM, T/D 
Losses 
No No No. Yes: Firms considered the quality 
targets too stringent. A revenue 
adjustment formula to achieve or 
exceed the target was then used. 
13 Information 
Disclosure 
Yes Yes (Gas) – Firms argued the info may 
be misused by some customers. 
No. No 
14 Strategic 
M&A 
No No No. Merging utilities oppose the use of pre-
merger data in benchmarking. 
15 Price Inflation 
in M&A 
No No No. The regulator uses historical values. 
Good-will therefore not relevant.. 
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4. Methodology - Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 
DEA has been a popular benchmarking method with electricity regulators (see Jamasb and 
Pollitt, 2001). DEA identifies an efficient frontier made up of the best-practice firms and 
uses this to measure the relative efficiency scores of the less efficient firms. Norway uses 
the DEA in setting revenue caps for regional electricity transmission and distribution 
utilities. An advantage of the method is that it does not require specification of a production 
or cost function. It allows calculation of allocative and technical efficiencies that can be 
decomposed into scale, congestion, and pure technical efficiencies (Färe et al., 1985). 
DEA is a non-parametric method and uses piecewise linear programming to calculate 
(rather than estimate) the efficient or best-practice frontier of a sample (see Farrell 1957; 
Färe et al. 1985). The decision-making units (DMUs) or firms that make up the frontier 
envelop the less efficient firms. The efficiency of the firms is calculated in terms of scores 
on a scale of 0 to 1, with the frontier firms receiving a score of 1. 
DEA models can be output or input oriented and can be specified as constant returns 
to scale (CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS). Output-oriented models maximise output 
for a given amount of input. Conversely, input-oriented models minimise input factors 
required for a given level of output. An input-oriented specification is generally regarded as 
the appropriate form for electricity distribution utilities as demand for their services is a 
derived demand that is beyond the control of utilities and that has to be met. 
The linear program calculating the efficiency score of the i-th firm in a sample of N 
firms in CRS models takes the form specified in Equation (3) where θ is a scalar (equal to 
the efficiency score) and λ represents an N×1 vector of constants. Assuming that the firms 
use K inputs and M outputs, X and Y represent K×N input and M×N output matrices 
respectively. The input and output column vectors for the i-th firm are represented by xi and 
yi respectively. The equation is solved once for each firm. In VRS models a convexity 
constraint Σλ=1 is added. This additional constraint ensures that the firm is compared 
against other firms with similar size. 
 
0
,0
,0
..
,min ,
≥
≥−
≥+−
λ
λθ
λ
θλθ
Xx
Yy
ts
i
i              (3) 
 
In equation (3) firm i is compared to a linear combination of sample firms which 
produce at least as much of each output as it does with the minimum possible amount of 
inputs. Figure 1 illustrates the main features of an input-oriented model with constant 
returns to scale. The figure shows three firms (G, H, R) that use two inputs (capital K, 
labour L) for a given output Y. The vertical and horizontal axis represent the capital and 
labour costs per unit of output respectively, and the line PP shows the relative price of the 
two inputs. 
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Figure 1: Data envelopment analysis 
 
 
Firms G and H produce the given output with lower inputs and form the efficient 
frontier that envelops the less efficient firm R. The technical and allocative efficiencies of 
firm R relative to the frontier can be calculated from OJ/OR and OM/OJ ratios respectively. 
Technical efficiency measures the ability of a firm to minimise inputs to produce a given 
level of output. Allocative efficiency reflects the ability of the firm to optimise the balance 
of different inputs, given input prices. The overall efficiency of firm R is measured from 
OM/OR. 
An important step in DEA is the choice of appropriate input and output variables. The 
variables should, to the extent possible, reflect the main aspects of resource-use in the 
activity concerned. DEA can also control for the effect of environmental variables that are 
beyond the control of the management of firms but affect their performance. Also, the basic 
DEA model illustrated above does not impose weights on model input and output variables, 
but it can be extended to incorporate value judgements in the form of relative weight 
restrictions imposed on model inputs or outputs (see Thanassoulis, 2001). 
An advantage of DEA is that inefficient firms are compared to actual firms rather 
than to a statistical measure. In addition, DEA does not require specification of a cost or 
production function. However, efficiency scores tend to be sensitive to the choice of input 
and output variables. Also, the results (scores) are sensitive to measurement errors in the 
frontier firms as these comprise the best-practice frontier. In addition, the method does not 
allow for stochastic factors and measurement errors. Further, as more variables are included 
in the models, the number of firms on the frontier increases, therefore it is important to 
examine the sensitivity of the efficiency scores and rank order of the firms to model 
specification. 
 
5. Data and preferred models 
 
5.1 Data 
 
In order to illustrate numerical examples of the possible effects of strategic behaviour in 
regulatory benchmarking, we utilise a data set comprising electricity distribution business 
of 28 utilities operating in the north-east of the United States. The data used is based on 
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annual company returns to Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) and DEPPD 
(2002) for the financial year 2000. Within our sample we focus on a subset of 5 utilities and 
examine the effects of gaming on them. These focus firms could be viewed as firms 
operating under the jurisdiction of a regulatory commission in a federal state being 
benchmarked against a national sample. 
Alternatively, the focus firms may be regarded as utilities operating under a national 
regulator being benchmarked against an international sample.12 Individual utilities are not 
identified here as we wish to address the issues involved at a general level. Table 3 shows 
the summary statistics for the entire sample and for the focus firms. As shown in the table, 
the focus firms are relatively far from the extreme ends of the larger sample. 
 
 
     Table 3: Summary statistics for the sample and focus firms. 
 Distribution 
OPEX 
(‘000 $US)13 
Electricity 
delivered 
(MWh) 
Customers 
(#) 
Network 
length  
(miles) 
Meters  
(#) 
Max.  
Demand 
(MV) 
Focus firms: 
 Firm 1 88,033 14,144,052  582,339  16,390 252,622 2,673  
Firm 2 219,238 21,261,331  1,000,526  23,391 1,052,369 4,961  
Firm 3 43,608 14,607,563  491,142  14,900 524,605 2,342  
Firm 4 20,057 7,933,735  134,554  6,121 174,067 926  
Firm 5 94,822 21,714,983  680,405  21,735 789,637 3,311 
Sample: 
Mean 110,873 13,505,020 553,329 13,095 598,271 2,324 
Minimum 2,885 124,425 26,672 120 27,840 101 
Maximum 478,345 41,834,169 3,074,592 41,000 3,301,863 9,379 
 
 
5.2 Preferred models 
 
In order to examine the possible effects of strategic behaviour on the outcome of regulation 
benchmarking, we use relatively familiar DEA model specifications. An initial model 
serves as the reference or base model against which we compare the outcomes of strategic 
behaviour. A financial model is also used to calculate the benefits and losses from changes 
in relative efficiency. 
 
5.2.1 DEA models 
 
Our preferred model is input-oriented and assumes constant returns to scale (CRS) so that 
the measured relative efficiency of firms is not affected by their size. This is consistent with 
                                                          
12
 See Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) for an example and discussion of international regulation benchmarking. 
13
 The operating expenditures are calculated from reported data and adjusted to allow for an allocation of 
common administration costs. 
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the DEA models adopted by the Dutch and Norwegian regulators. Empirical studies in 
Norway, Canada, New Zealand, and Switzerland find evidence of the presence of 
economies of scale in electric distribution utilities. However, in some of these studies, the 
minimum efficient firm size in terms of number of customers is estimated to be around 
20,000-30,000.14 Also, Allas and Leslie (2001) report that about 85 percent of costs vary 
with the number of customers and the units of energy delivered. 
The preferred model uses a single cost input reflecting the OPEX of the distribution 
business of the utilities. The output variables in our preferred model are: (i) units of 
electricity delivered, (ii) number of customers, and (iii) length of network. The literature on 
relative efficiency analysis and benchmarking does not reveal a universally agreed set of 
input and output variables for modelling of electricity distribution utilities. However, as 
reported in Jamasb and Pollitt (2001), the input and output variables in our simple model 
are among the most widely used in studies of relative performance. 
 
5.2.2 Financial model 
 
The financial model calculates the efficient level of costs for individual firms as the product 
of the efficiency scores and OPEX in the reference year. The model assumes that the 
efficient cost levels are achieved by the end of a five-year regulatory rate period. This is 
achieved through annual efficiency improvement requirements or X-factors calculated for 
individual firms. Figure 2 illustrates a gliding path reflecting combinations of X-factors and 
reference prices. In this example, a firm’s OPEX are benchmarked while it is allowed to 
recovers its depreciation costs and earn a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) on its 
regulatory asset base (RAB). Line AC shows the path bringing the allowed revenues of the 
firm to the efficient frontier level, inclusive of an anticipated frontier shift BC, during the 
course of a 5-year rate period. 
 
 
2002 2007
Cost of capital (Wacc)  x RAB
Depreciation
Efficient Opex
Allowed Revenue
excluding taxes
Actual Opex
X factor under Opex benchmark
Actual Revenue 2002
X factor under total cost benchmark
Frontier Shift
B
C
Figure 2: The gliding path of allowed revenue during a rate period 
                                                          
14
 See Filippini (1986, 1987, 1988) and Filippini and Wold (1998) for studies of Switzerland; Salvanes and 
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However, in reality, the ability of highly inefficient firms to achieve cost savings 
during a given period may be limited. Recognising this practical limitation, regulators in 
The Netherlands and Norway have introduced limits on maximum efficiency requirements 
imposed on least efficient firms. The assigned X-factors in this model are therefore capped 
at 8 percent per year (as in The Netherlands). In addition, the model assumes that the 
efficient cost levels can achieve a further 1 percent efficiency gain per year over a 5-year 
rate period. The total efficiency requirements or effective X-factors are then used to 
calculate the allowed revenues to cover the firms’ operating expenditures. Ordinarily, 
regulatory models calculate X-factors for total allowed distribution revenues regardless of 
whether operating or total expenditures (operating plus capital expenditure) are 
benchmarked. However, for the purposes of simplicity and transparency, we focus solely 
on the gaming OPEX and its effect on efficiency score and X-factor. 
 
6. Results 
 
As discussed in Section 3, there are various ways in which strategic behaviour can affect 
the outcome of a regulation benchmarking. In this section, we report benchmarking results 
using a base model, which we assume to be the regulator’s model of choice in the absence 
of gaming behaviour. We then examine the results of three selected cases of deviation from 
the base model that can arise from strategic gaming. 
 
6.1 Base case – No gaming 
 
Table 4 shows the calculated efficiency scores for the distribution business of 28 electric 
utilities in our sample (the base model was described in Section 5). Utilities F1-F5 are the 
focus firms assumed to be operating under the jurisdiction of a single regulator and being 
benchmarked within a sample of firms. As shown in the sample, the range of efficiency 
scores for the sample is rather wide (26-100 percent). Four firms, two of which are among 
our focus firms (F3 and F4), have an efficiency of 100 percent and constitute the efficient 
frontier. Utilities F1 and F2 of the focus firms score relatively low, while firm F5 is the 
most efficient non-frontier firm in our focus group. 
Table 5 summarises the results of the base model. As shown in the table, the implied 
X-factor for firms F1 and F2 exceeds the maximum 8 percent and is therefore capped at 
that level. The final X-factor is the effective (or total) rate of cost reduction assigned to the 
firms and includes a 1 percent annual frontier shift in efficient cost level. It is interesting to 
note that under a capping regime, a lower efficiency score can translate into a lower final 
X-factor. 
The two frontier firms in our focus group are the smallest firms in terms of OPEX in 
the reference year while the largest firm appears as the least efficient firm among these. The 
table also shows the allowed OPEX for the firms during the rate period and the required 
cost reductions that the effective X-factors represent in relation to the OPEX in the 
reference year. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Tjotta (1994, 1998) for Norway; Giles and Wyatt (1993) for New Zealand; and Yatchew (2000) for Canada. 
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Table 4: Efficiency scores for the sample - the base case 
No. Efficiency  
Score 
No. Efficiency  
Score 
F1 57.6% F15 100.0% 
F2 38.1% F16 72.8% 
F3 100.0% F17 34.9% 
F4 100.0% F18 22.6% 
F5 67.6% F19 58.5% 
F6 41.6% F20 49.3% 
F7 29.0% F21 41.8% 
F8 30.4% F22 34.3% 
F9 78.9% F23 50.8% 
F10 32.1% F24 60.0% 
F11 43.2% F25 76.1% 
F12 43.7% F26 57.3% 
F13 61.6% F27 100.0% 
F14 66.8% F28 43.6% 
 
 
Table 5: Summary results - Base case 
Base Case 
 
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5 
Efficiency Score 57.6% 38.1% 100.0% 100.0% 67.6% 
X-factor 10.4% 17.5% 0.0% 0.0% 7.5% 
Implied X-factor 8.0% 8.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.5% 
Final X-factor 8.8% 8.5% 1.0% 1.0% 8.5% 
      
OPEX - reference 
year (‘000 US$) 
88,033 219,238 43,608 20,057 94,822 
      
Accumulated 
allowed OPEX - rate 
period (‘000 US$) 
337,629 847,161 211,587 97,316 367,535 
      
Accumulated 
required cost savings 
- rate period (‘000 
US$) 
102,537 249,027 6,455 2,969 106,575 
 
 
6.2 Gaming OPEX 
 
As discussed previously, one of the perverse incentives associated with price cap regulation 
is that firms may attempt to inflate their distribution cost base before a price review. As 
shown here, relatively small changes in X-factors that do not appear significant in relation 
to the original X-factor, can result in considerable revenue implications. 
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Table 6 shows the effect of 1, 5, and 10 percent increase in the OPEX of firm F5 in 
the reference year 2000 on its allowed revenue for the rate period 2001-2005. The table 
shows that as the firm’s cost base increases, its efficiency score declines. This results in 
higher X-factors and consequently higher cost saving requirements. At the same time, the 
firm enjoys a higher cost base that gives it a higher level of allowed revenues. The table 
shows the net increase in allowed cost recovery or revenue after controlling for the effect of 
higher efficiency requirements through higher X-factor. For example, a 5 percent increase 
in the cost base prior to rate review results in a reduction of the relative efficiency score of 
6 percentage points, yet also results in a 3.6 percent net increase in allowed revenues 
corresponding to $19.59 per customer during the rate period. 
 
 
Table 6: Summary results – Gaming OPEX 
Firm 5: 
 
Base case OPEX 1% OPEX 5% OPEX 
10% 
Efficiency score 67.6% 66.9% 64.3% 61.4% 
X-factor 7.5% 7.7% 8.4% 9.3% 
Implied X-factor 7.5% 7.7% 8.0% 8.0% 
Final X-factor 8.5% 8.7% 8.9% 8.9% 
     
OPEX in reference year 
(‘000 US$) 
94,822 95,770 99,563 104,304 
     
Accumulated required cost 
savings (‘000 US$) 
106,575 109,697 116,954 122,072 
∆ accumulated required cost 
savings (‘000 US$) 
- 3,122 10,379 15,497 
     
Accumulated allowed OPEX 
in rate period (‘000 US$) 
367,535 369,154 380,861 399,449 
∆ accumulated allowed 
OPEX in rate period (‘000 
US$) 
- 1,620 13,327 31,914 
as % of accumulated allowed 
revenue (in base case) 
- 0.4% 3.6% 8.7% 
$ Revenue increase (+)/ 
decrease (-) per customer 
- 2.38 19.59 46.90 
 
 
Table 7 shows the effect of a 10 percent cost inflation for the other four firms. As 
shown in the table, the frontier firms F3 and F4 retain the full increase in their cost base. 
The least efficient firms F1 and F2, despite receiving lower efficiency scores relative to the 
base case, due to their capped X-factors, benefit fully from higher cost base. They also 
achieve an additional small gain as the 1 percent frontier shift is applied to a lower efficient 
cost base. 
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Table 7: Summary results – Gaming OPEX with 10% 
 
 
Firm 1 
10% 
Firm 2 
10% 
Firm 3 
10% 
Firm 4 
10% 
Efficiency score 52.4% 34.7% 100.0% 100.0% 
X-factor 12.1% 19.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Implied X-factor 8.0% 8.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Final X-factor 8.7% 8.5% 1.0% 1.0% 
     
OPEX in reference year 
(‘000 US$) 
96,837 241,161 47,969 22,063 
     
Accumulated required cost 
savings (‘000 US$) 
112,040 272,694 7,100 3,266 
∆ accumulated required cost 
savings (‘000 US$) 
9,503 23,668 645 297 
     
Accumulated allowed 
revenue in rate period (‘000 
US$) 
372,143 933,112 232,746 107,048 
∆ accumulated allowed 
OPEX in rate period (‘000 
US$) 
34,514 85,951 21,159 9,732 
as % of accumulated allowed 
OPEX (in base case) 
10.2% 10.1% 10.0% 10.0% 
$ Revenue increase (+)/ 
decrease (-) per customer 
59.3 85.9 43.1 72.3 
 
 
6.3 Influencing output weights 
 
The selection of appropriate output variables for use in benchmarking models can be a 
source of disagreement between regulator and firm. In principle, the main issue is the extent 
to which the selected variables are true cost drivers and how accurately they portray the 
production function. The underlying concern is how the choice and use of variables can 
affect the relative efficiency measure and, consequently, firms’ revenues. We modify our 
base model by assigning a set of weights to the output variables. 
As mentioned in Section 4, DEA can be used with weight restrictions applied to 
inputs and outputs. In the following example, we examine the effect of output weights 
similar to those used by the UK regulator OFGEM, namely: (i) number of customers 50 
percent, (ii) units of electricity delivered 25 percent, and (iii) length of distribution network 
25 percent. The weights on the outputs are introduced by including additional constraints to 
our basic DEA model (see Thanassoulis, 2001). Table 8 shows the summary results of 
applying the weights to the output variables in the base model. 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper CMI EP 19/DAE 0312, January 2003, Dept. of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge 
 22 
 
       Table 8: Summary results - Influencing output weights 
Outputs with weights Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5 
Efficiency Score 42.5% 26% 87.4% 100.0% 59.5% 
X-factor 15.8% 23.6% 2.7% 0.0% 9.9% 
Implied X-factor 8.0% 8.0% 2.7% 0.0% 8.0% 
Final X-factor 8.6% 8.4% 3.6% 1.0% 8.8% 
      
OPEX in reference 
year (‘000 US$) 
88,033 219,238 43,608 20,057 94,822 
      
Accumulated Required 
cost savings (‘000 
US$) 
100,568 245,074 22,382 2,969 110,708 
∆ Accumulated 
Required cost saving 
(‘000 US$) 
     
      
Accumulated allowed 
revenue in rate period 
(‘000 US$) 
339,598 851,114 195,659 97,316 363,402 
∆ Accumulated allowed 
revenue in rate period 
(‘000 US$) 
1,969 3,952 -15,928 0 -4,133 
as % of accumulated 
allowed OPEX  
(in base case) 
0.6% 0.5% -7.5% 0.0% -1.1% 
$ Revenue increase 
(+)/ decrease (-) per 
customer 
3.4 4.0 -32.4 0.0 -6.1 
 
 
The table shows that, after introducing the output weights, firm F3 is no longer on the 
efficient frontier and its allowed revenues decrease with 7.5 percent corresponding to a 
$32.43 reduction per customer. It is noteworthy, that although firms F1 and F2 have lower 
efficiency scores than in the base case, they achieve a relatively small net gain from the 
weights. The observed gain is due to the fact that in the revised model the 1 percent frontier 
shift is applied to a lower efficient cost base while the firms’ X-factor is, despite a nominal 
increase, still capped at 8 percent. However, a lower efficiency score for firm F5 means that 
it faces an increase in effective X-factor up to the cap limit that results in a net loss for the 
firm. 
The results shown here indicate that while there is some potential for moderate 
gains by the two least efficient firms, the negative effect on more efficient firms outweighs 
the gain. The results from this example indicate that conflicting interest among the firms 
may reduce the likelihood of influencing the base model in this direction. It should, 
however, be pointed out that the magnitude of potential benefits and losses, and the number 
of gainers and losers, is highly dependent on the composition of the benchmarking sample. 
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6.4 Changing the firm through mergers and acquisitions 
 
The changing structure of the electricity industry has prompted many utilities to achieve 
efficiency improvements through mergers and acquisitions (M&A). From a strategic 
perspective, mergers can also help utilities to reposition themselves in the market by 
changing their scale of operations and reconfiguring their resources. However, M&A 
involve two sources of concern for regulators that use benchmarking: (i) transactions 
intended to influence the relative position of the firm without achieving real efficiency 
gains and (ii) the shrinking number of firms and reduction in information on which 
regulators base their analysis (see Nillesn, Pollitt, and Keats, 2001). The first type of 
merger may be regarded as a special form of collusion to game the regulator’s incentive 
scheme.15 
In this section we examine a case of “virtual” efficiency improvement achieved by 
the merger of two firms. Table 9 shows the results when a frontier firm (F3) and a relatively 
efficient firm (F5) merge to form a new entity. 
 
 
Table 9: Summary results - Merger effects 
Merger between 
F3 and F5 
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 4 Firms 3&5 
Efficiency score 67.3% 42.7% 100.0% 91.5% 
X-factor 7.6% 15.6% 0.0% 1.8% 
Implied X-factor 7.6% 8.0% 0.0% 1.8% 
Final X-factor 8.5% 8.6% 1.0% 2.7% 
     
OPEX in reference year 
(‘000 US$) 
88,033 219,238 20,057 138,430 
     
Accumulated required cost 
savings (‘000 US$) 
99,621 250,510 2,969 54,506 
∆ Accumulated required 
cost saving (‘000 US$) 
    
     
Accumulated allowed 
revenue in rate period (‘000 
US$) 
340,545 845,678 97,316 637,645 
∆ accumulated allowed 
revenue in rate period (‘000 
US$) 
2,916 -1,483 0 58,523 
as % of accumulated 
allowed OPEX (in base 
case) 
0.9% -0.2% 0.0% 10.1% 
$ Revenue increase (+)/ 
decrease (-) per customer 
5.0 -1.5 0.00 50.0 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Collusion can also take the form of collaboration on the pace of cost saving effort among the firms but this 
is beyond the scope of this study (see e.g. CPB, 2000). 
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Firms F1 and F2 exhibit higher efficiency scores relative to the base case due to the 
reduction in the number of frontier firms. A higher score for F1 means that the firm’s X-
factor falls below the cap threshold and therefore benefits from the new higher efficiency 
score. However, for firm F2 the higher efficiency score means that the 1 percent annual 
frontier shift is applied to a higher cost base while the firm’s X-factor remains capped 
despite the higher scores. 
The results show that a merger between firms F3 and F5 can result in 10.1 percent 
increase in allowed revenues corresponding to $50 per customer during the rate period. 
Although a range of factors can influence a firm’s decision to merge or acquire, simple 
comparative efficiency analysis can reveal the side benefits or loses associated with the 
decisions. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
A number of regulators have used benchmarking in periodic price controls as part of the 
incentive-based regulation of natural monopolies. An important motive for the use of 
benchmarking has been that yardstick regulation encourages efficiency and reduces reliance 
on the firms’ own information. However, as discussed in this paper, the use of 
benchmarking can lead firms to pursue virtual rather than true performance improvements 
by gaming the regulator’s benchmarking in a number of ways that are contrary to the 
intentions of the scheme. 
We showed how strategic behaviour in the context of benchmarking may lead to (i) 
foregone efficiency improvements or dead-weight losses, (ii) welfare transfers from 
customers to firms, and (iii) welfare transfers among firms. We also used numerical 
examples to illustrate selected aspects of strategic gaming associated with regulatory 
benchmarking and their effects. We show that the net effect of gaming can depend on the 
method of translating efficiency scores into X-factors and the caps applied to them (i.e. the 
extent to which the efficiency gap among the firms can or is to be closed in a given rate 
period). We also showed the interrelationship between gaming by one firm and its effect on 
the X-factors for other firms. 
The following lessons can be drawn from our review of issues and examples: 
• The allocation of costs and assets when distribution is unbundled from other utility 
activities, and the reliability of this information base for subsequent price controls, are both 
important. Regulators need to pay particular attention to increasing the reliability of 
information through audits, technical studies, and comparison of cost patterns in review vs. 
non-review periods. 
• Regulators need to conduct sensitivity analyses of their chosen benchmarking approach 
and data sets in order to identify the most influential variables and to assess the effects of 
measurement errors and likely gaming. 
• An important strength of DEA is the ability to accommodate multiple inputs and outputs. 
Using models with a single cost input variable might increase the sensitivity of results to 
changes in costs. 
• Mergers are increasingly a source of concern for regulators and utilities. Both can use 
benchmarking analyses to determine the effects of possible and actual mergers on the firms 
in the sector and their implied X-factors. Such analysis can also help regulators to design 
their policies towards separating virtual from actual efficiency gains in mergers. 
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• Regulators need to recognise the shortcomings of their chosen benchmarking methods 
and to apply discretion and judgment in the use of results. For example, in order to reduce 
reliance on a limited number of variables, regulators can use competing models and average 
their results. In some instances, it may be preferable to simplify the process by placing the 
firms in a few categories with similar X-factors. 
• Finally, from a theoretical and methodological point of view, regulatory benchmarking 
leaves considerable scope for improvement. Regulatory benchmarking therefore owes 
much of its legitimacy to the wider regulatory framework and the implementation process. 
Transparency of the benchmarking exercise and decision process together with the public 
availability of underlying data, and combined with consultations and hearings, can provide 
third party scrutiny and thus increase acceptability and reduce gaming. 
Regulatory benchmarking does not eliminate the issue of asymmetric information on 
firms’ costs and efficiency improvement effort as known under rate of return regulation. 
Rather, it adds new dimensions to this issue and the ways in which firms can behave 
strategically. Countering strategic behaviour can partly be overcome by increasing data 
accuracy and improving data collection procedures. The information requirement for 
reliable regulatory benchmarking therefore appears to be higher than initially expected. The 
continued efforts made by regulators using benchmarking to improve data quality are 
testament to this fact. 
At the same time, regulated utilities need to conduct their own benchmarking analysis 
in order to: 
• Examine the effect of the regulator’s choice of benchmarking method, variables, X-
factors. 
• Analyse the effects of possible gaming by other firms on their profits and available future 
partners for M&A. 
• Evaluate benefits and losses of mergers involving own firm or competitors and to convey 
their findings to regulators. 
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